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We examine whether the voluntary formation of a Risk Committee (RC) compromises the 
effectiveness of other monitoring duties carried out by the board members. We argue that adding 
more monitoring committees increases the board’s internal busyness, which reduces the 
effectiveness of monitoring by the Audit Committee (AC). Using a sample of financial firms over 
the period 2007 to 2011 from the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC), we find that voluntarily 
adopting a risk committee impairs the effectiveness of the audit committee, which in turn 
reduces financial reporting quality. Our findings suggest that multiple layers of monitoring 
capacity viz-a-viz the existence of both an audit and risk committee may weaken the quality of 
monitoring provided by the audit committee. 
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The board of directors exists as one of the strongest 
corporate governance mechanisms, put in place to 
ensure that, the interests of shareholders of the 
company are protected. Traditionally, the literature 
concerning the role of the board of directors has 
concentrated on multiple outside directorships. For 
instance, Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) 
contend with the fact that directors with multiple 
outside directorships may be sufficiently busy, such 
that, they do not function as effective monitors. 
Consistent with this argument, Core, Holthausen and 
Larcker (1999) find that outside multiple 
directorships lower the effectiveness of outside 
directors as corporate monitors because they 
become overcommitted and might shirk their 
responsibilities as monitors. Similarly, Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006) demonstrate that outside multiple 
directorship weakens board monitoring. However, 
there is little evidence on the effect of internal board 
busyness on monitoring. In this paper, we argue that 
internal board busyness also has a similar adverse 
effect on monitoring. Specifically, we argue that 
incrementing more monitoring committees increases 
the board’s internal busyness resulting in less work 
effort from the members to monitor management. 
Hence, we test how the voluntary formation of an 
additional board monitoring committee such as the 
RC, reduces the effectiveness of monitoring by the 
audit committee. 
Corporate governance, effective board 
monitoring and managerial accountability have been 
placed under scrutiny since the recent Global 
Financial Crisis. A frequently suggested solution to 
financial crises is that increasing the monitoring 
quality of the board of directors, could improve the 
board’s effectiveness (Field et al. 2013). Globally 
(e.g., GCC region14 and USA), regulators require firms 
to have three mandatory monitoring board sub-
committees (audit, compensation and nominating) 
for publicly listed firms. Whilst voluntarily adding 
more monitoring committees to the board increases 
their monitoring duties, directors’ oversight may be 
somewhat impaired because directors are generally 
busier and potentially equipped with less resources 
to deal with the hard issues requiring attention. 
Allen (1992) suggests that the monitoring function is 
more powerful when directors have more 
commitment to time and better resources.  
Ferris et al. (2003) and Jiraporn et al. (2009) 
provide evidence on how external directors’ 
busyness affect the firm’s performance. On the one 
hand, Ferris et al. (2003) find that multiple external 
directorship (outside board seats) does not diminish 
directors’ abilities to serve multiple internal board 
committees’ memberships.  On the other hand, 
Jiraporn et al. (2009) find that a greater number of 
external directorships reduces the ability of internal 
members of board monitoring committees to 
perform effectively. Hence, they suggest that 
external directorship plays a significant role in 
determining AC membership. Given this competing 
views on the role of multiple board membership, we 
are motivated to investigate the effects of the 
internal board members’ busyness on the AC 
monitoring effectiveness.15  
Faleye et al. (2011) examine how the intensity 
and busyness of internal board monitoring 
committees can influence the directors’ 
                                                          
14 GCC is Gulf Co-operation Council established in 1981 comprising of 
Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia (KSA), and United Arab 
Emiratis (UAE).  
15 We consider the internal board monitoring busyness by board internal 
committees. The outside directorship is not a popular phenomenon in the 
GCC (TNI 2008 survey).  
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effectiveness in performing their role in the advisory 
committee. They find that busy directors sitting on 
internal board monitoring committees (audit 
committee, remuneration, compensation and 
corporate governance), limit their ability to perform 
in board strategic and planning committees. 
Specifically, they argue that independent directors 
are assigned multiple oversight tasks; hence, they 
are overcommitted in an advisory role. In this study, 
we extend this line of argument by suggesting that 
the voluntary formation of an additional monitoring 
committee such as the RC will increase the internal 
board’s oversight workload and thereby, limit  
directors’ abilities in effectively discharging their 
duties in monitoring committees. While Jiraporn et 
al. (2009) suggest that board members external 
directorship significantly explains the AC 
assignments, they also conclude that the 
relationship between the number of external 
directorship and audit committee assignments are 
non-linearly related. 
 In this paper, we investigate how an internal 
directorship’s busyness affects audit committee 
assignments. Based on board signalling theory 
(prestigious board) and busyness hypothesis, we 
examine how more internal directorships of the 
board will have an adverse impact particularly, in 
regards to the monitoring of the AC. We argue that 
this could occur through compromising the AC’s 
composition quality, thus, reducing its effectiveness 
in improving the firm’s Financial Reporting Quality 
(FRQ).16 
Several reasons motivate us to use the 
voluntary formation of RC as a benchmark for a 
firm’s internal board busyness as an effective factor, 
to reduce the relationship between AC and FRQ. 
First, in the GCC listed firms, audit, remuneration 
and compensation committees are mandatory, while 
the RC is not, hence, we assume that firms that form 
an additional monitoring board committee will 
increase their monitoring workload for directors 
compared to firms that do not. Second, duties and 
responsibilities of the RC in all code of corporate 
governance in GCC are assigned under the 
responsibility and oversight of the AC, hence, the 
overlapping responsibilities between both 
committees can create conflict. This suggests that 
“voluntarily” adopting an RC leads the board to 
nominate a director who used to or still serves in the 
AC to be a member of the RC compared to directors 
who serve on other internal committees because of 
the director’s prior experiences and background in 
risk management issues. Third, the RC is considered 
a monitoring committee, thus, adopting an RC will 
increase monitoring duties and oversight of the 
board.  
Using data from six GCC countries financial 
firms’ annual reports, we provide evidence that the 
internal monitoring busyness (through formation of 
RC) reduces the quality of AC composition which 
then reduces its monitoring effectiveness. First, we 
find that the quality of AC’s composition reduces 
significantly when the firm “voluntarily” adopts RC. 
Specifically, we find that the mean difference of AC 
quality is significant when the firm “voluntarily” 
adopts RC. Second, we find consistent results which 
                                                          
16 Quality of AC composition is measured based on 4 characteristics that 
have been used in prior literature namely: majority independent director, 
qualification, size, and independence of the AC chairman. 
indicate that, in the presence of RC, the association 
between AC and FRQ proxies is reduced. This result 
might be due to time-series problem; hence, we have 
repeated our analysis by considering if the firm 
“voluntarily” adopted RC in the current year (
t
), and 
yet did not adopt RC in the previous year 
(t-1)
. After 
re-running the regressions, we find consistent 
results that show that adopting RC reduces the 
relationship between AC and FRQ. The results 
suggest that the formation of RC reduces the quality 
of AC composition which in turn lowers the financial 
reporting quality. This result is generally consistent 
with the recent findings of Tani and Smith (2015), 
who demonstrate that the busyness of the audit 
committee chairman and financial expert weakens 
the monitoring and oversight role that audit 
committees play in the financial reporting process. 
Third, self-selection bias can be a case in our 
regression. Neglecting self-selection for firms having 
only RC and selecting financial firms may result in 
bias and an inconsistent estimator. Hence, we 
replicate our analysis using Heckman's (1979) two-
stage self-selection bias model. We find that our 
results are in line with baseline regressions, 
suggesting that estimates based on self-selection 
bias cannot explain or justify the reason for the 
negative association between AC and FRQ in the 
presence of RC.  
This study enrich corporate governance 
literature in four important ways. First, this study 
contributes to the limited, albeit, growing literature 
on internal busyness by providing empirical 
evidence to show that the internal busyness of the 
board has a significant impact on the effectiveness 
of board monitoring. While prior research (e.g., 
Vafeas 2005) extensively documents that the quality 
of AC’s monitoring has a positive impact in 
improving the board’s effectiveness (e.g., FRQ), no 
study has till date examined whether introducing 
voluntary monitoring RC deteriorates or improves 
the board’s effectiveness.  
Second, this study is one of the first to 
theoretically introduce an interaction between 
signalling and busyness theories, in order to explain 
how the voluntary creation of an additional 
monitoring committee (e.g., RC) can influence the 
board’s effectiveness, by testing the conditional 
effects between the FRQ and the monitoring quality 
of AC in the presence of RC. Third, given the recent 
emphasis on regulatory bodies to strengthen risk 
management and board monitoring, an empirical 
study on the association between voluntary 
formations of RC as well as board monitoring 
busyness and effectiveness is of great importance. 
Our study responds to this call by investigating this 
relationship, suggesting that even internal busyness 
of the board’s monitoring sub-committee can harm 
the shareholders’ interests by increasing the 
oversight time of monitoring directors on the board. 
Fourth, we contribute to the literature on audit 
committees by demonstrating that when the quality 
of the AC composition is reduced through the 
formation of additional monitoring committees, 
such as RC, the financial reporting quality will be 
adversely affected.  
In summary, our findings suggest that multiple 
layers of monitoring capacity viz-a-viz the existence 
of both an audit and risk committee may impair the 
quality of monitoring provided by the audit 
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committee. In other words, the internal busyness of 
the board weakens the monitoring and oversight 
role that audit committee plays in the quality of the 
financial reporting. The implication is that, 
regulators need to consider directors’ commitments 
and busyness when making rules for mandatory 
establishment of risk committee. This study has 
international implications for regulators who have 
rules governing the existence and composition of 
committees. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows: Section 2 reviews the GCC setting and 
relevant prior studies, and develops the testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 focuses on the research 
design, data sources and sample selection. Section 4 
contains the empirical results, while Section 5 states 
our main conclusions. 
 
2. GCC SETTING, BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT  
 
2.1. GCC Setting and Background 
 
The Gulf Corporation Council was established in 
1981, to strengthen the economic co-operation and 
development of six countries comprising of, Oman, 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and 
United Arab Emirates (UAE). The GCC countries 
collectively constituted one of the fastest growing 
developing economies, and the GCC stock markets, 
represent emerging but equally rapidly growing 
markets (Al-Shammari et al. 2008). All corporate 
codes in GCC countries recommend and encourage 
firms to form different types of board sub-
committees, including AC, remuneration committee, 
and corporate governance committee. However, 
these codes do not mandate the establishment of RC 
(Risk Committee). Hence, the creation of RC is 
primarily voluntary. Risk management policy, 
accountability, and risk disclosure, are currently 
under AC’s supervision and responsibility in all 
corporate governance codes in the GCC region. 
Although, none of the GCC corporate governance 
codes require firms to establish a separate RC 
(except in Kuwait- from 2016), about 39% of our 
sample of GCC financial firms shows the existence 
of a separate RC.  
Two opposing views exist in the literature in 
relation to the voluntary formation of RC. 
Proponents argue that, since RC is charged with 
monitoring and managing business risks, therefore, 
the directors (members) of RC will objectively act to 
safeguard the interests of shareholders. On the 
other hand, the opponents argue that, directors 
having multiple board membership will have limited 
time to concentrate on various aspects of corporate 
risk, so RC will unlikely be effective in protecting 
shareholders’ interests. 
Jiraporn et al. (2009) and Bradbury (1990) 
suggest that board size, composition, and ownership 
structure play a significant role in voluntarily 
adopting the internal board monitoring committee. 
The GCC region provides an ideal setting to test our 
hypotheses. The GCC political institutions are built 
systematically favouring specific classes (Amenta 
2000), who have controls over many big government 
banks and financial listed firms. Furthermore, a 
small number of government representatives who 
are mainly from ruling families and rich merchant 
families in the board of directors, regulate and 
control the state and economy rather than vice versa 
(Boron 1995; Hertog 2012; Ozel 2003). In addition, it 
is “Socially” accepted that the “Sheik”17 directors in 
the GCC expect absolute obedience and are not 
willing to be questioned (Sidani and Al Ariss 2013).  
Ruling families and family directors are largely 
dominant in the GCC region. For instance, the TNI 
(2008) survey found that in Qatar, the directors from 
ruling families and top 9 families are represented by 
24% and 25% directors in listed firms, respectively. 
Hence, the high influence of the ruling families in 
the board composition may have consequences on 
the firm’s financial reporting quality (Chaney et al. 
2011), which may subsequently increase the board’s 
internal busyness. Moreover, the board’s internal 
busyness is worthy of study in the GCC as the 
external board directorship has been widely 
investigated in prior survey and has been found to 
be the least popular in all GCC’s publicly listed firms 
(TNI Survey 2008). For example, in Bahrain, the 2, 3, 
4, 5 and 6 boards seat are only represented by about 
5.8%, 2.9%, 0.3%, 0.9%, 0.3% of the total sample 
respectively.18 
 
2.2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
The literature on board monitoring is lengthy and 
dates back to Berle and Means (1980). The board of 
directors is an apex body in an organisation which 
monitors the activities of internal management. The 
board of directors in most public corporations are 
comprised of inside directors who hold other 
positions in the firm and outside directors who have 
no such affiliation. Generally, internal monitoring is 
likely to be stronger when the board of directors and 
its committees, are dominated by outside directors. 
The outside directors are often seen as independent 
and objective monitors, protecting the interests of 
various stakeholders against managerial 
opportunism. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that 
outside directors have greater incentives to monitor 
corporate decisions on behalf of shareholders, since 
they “…have incentives to develop reputations as 
experts in decision control…the value of their 
human capital depends primarily on their 
performance as their internal manager” (p. 315). A 
significant aspect of an effective board committee is 
that outside directors give adequate time and 
devotion to their jobs and it can be determined by 
how busy a director in the board committee is (Song 
and Windram 2004). There are conflicting views on 
the consequences of directors’ busyness. One view 
suggests that holding multiple directorships (proxy 
for busyness) allows knowledge spill-over to take 
place in the boards they sit on and thus, potentially 
enhance their reputation as decision experts (Fama 
1980; Ferris et al. 2003; Kaplan and Reishus 1990; 
Shivdasani 1993; Yermack 1996). For example, a 
busy audit committee director has a good experience 
and this will enhance his monitoring effectiveness 
(Song and Windram 2004). However, the opponents 
argue that a busy director may have less time to 
dedicate to each individual board committee he 
serves in. For instance, Morck et al. (1988) claim that 
                                                          
17 Sheik is a term used to entitle the front (leader or governor) of a tribe who 
inherits the title after his father. 
18 As an additional test, we also control ownership structure on the board of 
directors.   
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time factor can negatively  influence directors’ 
effectiveness in monitoring. Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) also suggest that time is a main constraint for 
directors in any board. Core et al. (1999) report that 
more directorships can make directors very busy, 
therefore, the ability of over committed directors 
serving on multiples boards, is dampened (Core et 
al. 1999; Fich and Shivdasani 2006) to perform their 
fiduciary role. Similarly, Faleye et al. (2011) suggest 
that the dynamics of internal work assignment 
through the board internal committees’ 
responsibilities generates even greater directors’ 
over-commitment. Other studies (e.g., Colquitt et al. 
2001; Leventhal 1976), suggest that directors serving 
on multiple internal board monitoring committees 
are hard pressed for time compared to directors 
serving in board advisory committees. Cashman et 
al. (2012) report that busy directors serving in 
numerous committees will have less available time 
which may eventually reduce their ability to serve in 
multiple monitoring committees. Furthermore, Ferris 
et al. (2003) argue that over committed directors 
serve less frequently on important board 
committees, such as the audit or the compensation 
committees.  
This line of argument suggests that voluntary 
adoption of an additional monitoring board 
committee, such as  the RC, will increase directors 
busyness (Faleye et al. 2011) and this may 
significantly affect the board’s monitoring 
effectiveness. Despite this controversy, very little 
research has been undertaken in relation to the 
effect of multiple monitoring committees’ 
directorships on board monitoring effectiveness, 
particularly, on audit committee. Our study is the 
first to test the hypothesis that firms that have 
multiple internal board monitoring committees tend 
to do a poor job of managing corporate affairs 
including reporting of financial performance. The 
board (directors) Busyness hypothesis of corporate 
directorships suggests that multiple internal board 
committees in the board over commit an individual 
director, and thus,  lower  the effectiveness of the 
board (Faleye et al. 2011). Thus, we expect to 
observe a negative association between FRQ and AC, 
if the firm adopts a high quality RC. In other words, 
we expect that an increased work-load would lead to 
the less effective performance of directors. Hence, in 
support of internal board busyness, the presence of 
an additional monitoring committee (e.g., RC) will 
reduce the effectiveness of AC. Thus, we 
hypothesize that: 
H1a: The voluntary formation of a high quality 
monitoring RC significantly reduces the effectiveness 
of AC. 
We try to ascertain how the voluntary 
formation of RC reduces the board’s effectiveness by 
relying on signalling theory. Board-signalling theory 
suggests that companies voluntarily create board 
internal committees and select its directors to signal 
its legitimacy and quality (Certo 2003; Spence 1973). 
Certo (2003) demonstrates that the prestigious 
structure of the board is important as it allows 
managers to influence the perceptions of customers, 
suppliers, and investors. On the other hand, 
directors (that is independent directors) accept the 
board’s membership to signal their talent as 
decision makers (Fama and Jensen 1983).  
From a signalling perspective, in the presence 
of asymmetric information, firms voluntarily form 
RC and  assign membership to signal firm value 
(Certo 2003). When a firm voluntarily forms an 
additional oversighting committee (e.g., RC), they 
disclose it in the corporate governance section of 
their annual reports, hence, readers are able to 
observe the signal. Choosing prestigious directors 
for RC (for example, those who are qualified and 
independent) will make this signal costly to imitate 
(Certo 2003). However, the voluntary formation of a 
credible and prestigious monitoring committee (e.g., 
RC) may on the other hand, compromise the quality 
of other monitoring committees. Specifically, we 
expect that RC could lower the monitoring quality of 
AC due to several reasons: First, in all codes of 
corporate governance in GCC countries, the risk 
management is assigned to AC except in Kuwait 
(starting from the year 2016)19, hence, adopting a 
separate RC will lead to an overlap of the risk 
management responsibilities. For instance, financial 
reporting is oversighted by AC, while risk reporting 
is shown to be under the responsibility of RC 
(Subramaniam et al. 2009; Hawkamah 2010). These 
overlapping duties between RC and AC indicate dual 
membership in both committees. However, busyness 
hypothesis indicates that the directors who serve in 
AC are the busiest directors and boards will face 
difficulties in assigning  them to more monitoring 
committees (Ferris et al. 2003). Second, Sun et al. 
(2014) provide evidence from financial firms that a 
busy director in AC has a lower ability to manage 
and monitor the firm’s risk. Accordingly, we expect 
the firm that has introduced an RC to makes 
directors in the AC to opt moving to RC or not 
serving in both committees. If this is the case, we 
will observe that the firms after adopting an 
RC,compromise the ability of ACs, thus, we 
hypothesize that:    
H1b: Voluntary formation of RC compromises 
the composition and monitoring quality of AC and 
thus reduces FRQ. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1. Sample and Data  
 
We collect our sample from financial companies 
listed in the six GCC capital markets (Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and UAE) for the year 
2007 – 2011. Data on corporate governance are 
hand-collected from annual reports and S&P Capital 
IQ, while all control variables data are collected from 
S& P Capital IQ database. We exclude industrial 
firms, firms inactive in capital market, and firms’ 
cross listed in GCC. This procedure results in 705 
observations. We then winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate 
undesirable influence of outliers. Due to FRQ models 
that uses lag variables and exclusion of firms with 
missing values on key variables, we obtain a total 
sample of 649 firm-year observations for our 
regressions (see Panel A of Table 1 for sample 
selection criteria). 
  
                                                          
19 In Kuwait risk management issues are assigned under risk committee, 
however, the code of corporate governance is not yet mandatory till 2016.  
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Table 1 Panel A. Sample Distribution Year and Country Firms (Obs.) 
 
Number of firms available in S & P Capital IQ for the GCC countries  629  
Less:  
          Industrial firms  421  
          Joint listed firms 2      
          Firms with unavailable annual report for disclosure items 65    
Final Sample year observations FRQ 
Kothari
 141 (649 Obs.) 
 
Panel B of Table 1 presents sample distribution 
that are used for our regressions by country and 
year. UAE is represented by 150 firms-year 
observations, followed by Kuwait (138) and Oman 
(101) year observations. Panel C of Table 1 also 
shows sample distribution based on year and 
financial sector. Banks presents 45% of the sample 
size followed by financial firms (153 observations), 
Insurance (116 observations) and Investment firms 
(83 observations). 
 
Table 1 Panel B. Sample Distribution Year and Country 
 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 Total 
Bahrain 17 17 17 17 17 85 
K.S.A 18 18 18 18 18 90 
Kuwait 27 28 28 28 27 138 
Oman 21 20 22 17 21 101 
Qatar 17 17 17 17 17 85 
U.A.E 30 30 30 30 30 150 
Total 130 130 132 127 130 649 
 
Table 1 Panel C. Sample Distribution Year and Financial Sector 
 
Industry 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Bank 60 59 60 58 60 297 
Financial 31 31 31 29 31 153 
Insurance 23 23 24 23 23 116 
Investment 16 17 17 17 16 83 
Total 130 130 132 127 130 649 
 
3.2. Dependent Variables 
 
Following prior literature (e.g., Faleye et al. 2011; 
Klein 2002; Rahman and Ali 2006), we rely on a 
proxy for the board and audit committee’s 
effectiveness, by using Financial Reporting Quality. 
Based on Kothari et al. (2005), this study adopts 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals by 
estimating the model below, using the year and 
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We also adopt the modified Jones (1991) model, 
suggested by Klein (2002), by estimating the model 

























 is calculated as the change 
in non-cash current assets, less the change in 
current liabilities, less depreciation and 
amortizations expenses for firm i in year t, scaled by 




is calculated as 
revenue growth of one year at year t for firm i scaled 
by lagged asset. PPE
t 
is the sum total of the firm’s 
property, plant and equipment scaled by lagged total 
asset, and ROA
t 
is the firm’s return on assets in year 
t for firm i. The residuals from the model are the 
discretionary accruals. Consistent with previous 
studies (Chen et al. 2011; Srinidhi and Gul 2007), we 
compute the absolute value and then multiply by – 1 
(FRQ 
t-i













Previous literature (e.g., , Klein 2002), suggests that 
firms with AC provide meaningful monitoring on 
FRQ. We test this relationship between FRQ and AC 




Factor analysis is widely used to capture the 
characteristics of the committee in governance 
studies (Sun et al. 2009; Tao and Hutchinson 2013). 
Prior literature utilize components factor analysis 
test to determine the board committees’ 
characteristics. Consistent with Tao and Hutchinson 
(2013), we conduct factor analysis to obtain one 
eigenvalue that represents all observable values 
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which are: 1. Independence20 which is equal to 1, if 
AC directors are a majority, otherwise 0; 2. If AC has 
at least one directors with a professional and 
academic qualification in accounting and finance 
(e.g., CPA)21, it is equal to 1 otherwise 0; 3. AC’s size 
is equal to 1, if RC’s size is higher than the median 
RC’s size of the firm, otherwise 0; and 4. AC’s chair 
is equal to 1, if AC is chaired by an independent 
director, otherwise 0. Un-tabulated results show that 
our eigenvalue of 3.630, is highly representative of 
72.61 % proportion, and other eigenvalues of AC 
characteristics scored less than one eigenvalue.22 We 
expect this measure to have a negative association if 
a firm has adopted RC.23  
Likewise, we calculate the proxy for quality of 
RC (RisFactor) by conducting components factor 
analysis of 4 variables of RC compositions. To arrive 
at a consistent measure for RC, we also use the four 
characteristics that we used in AC namely: 1. 
Independence equals 1, if RC directors are a 
majority, otherwise 0; 2. If RC has at least one 
director with a professional qualification, it is equal 
to 1 (e.g., CPA), otherwise 0; 3. RC’s size is equal to 1 
if RC’s size is higher than the median RC’s size of 
the firm, otherwise 0; and 4. RC’s chair is equal to 1 
if RC is chaired by an independent director, 
otherwise 0. We obtain one eigenvalue of 2.667 
(66.68% proportion), and other eigenvalues are less 
than 1, then we predict the RisFactor with 2.667 
eigenvalue. Finally, firms with higher RisFactor 
(proxy for high quality RC) are recorded as 1, if the 




Beasley and Salterio (2001) suggest that 
independence, qualification and size are 
interdependent characteristics in the board. Hence, 
in this measure, we aggregate the 4 characteristics 
of AC mentioned in section 3.3.2, then the total is 
scaled by 4 items. We regress this measure with FRQ, 
in the presence of RC=1. 
 
3.4. Control Variables 
 
Based on previous studies (e.g., Francis and Wang 
2008; Klein 2002; Leuz et al. 2003; Vafeas 2005), we 
use firm-specific and country-specific level variables 
as control. First, for the firm-specific factor, we use 
                                                          
20 The definition of independence is an area where there are differencing 
approaches among the GCC countries. For example, In Oman, K.S.A and 
U.A.E, an independent director should not be an employee or senior 
executive within the preceding 2 years, in Qatar within preceding 3 years 
and 1 year in Bahrain, while prior career is not mentioned in the code of 
governance of Kuwait. Hence, in this study, a director is considered 
independent, if he/she meets the definition of independence as per country 
code. 
21 We consider academic qualification in accounting and finance (Ph.D., 
Master, and Bachelor) and professional accounting and finance certification 
(e.g., CPA, ACCA, and CFA). 
22 Generation of eigenvalue was also used as a proxy for quality measure 
(see Miihkinen 2012). 
23 Components factor analysis correlation table for AC and RC are available 
upon request. 
24 We also repeat our analysis using greater than median quintile of (75%), 
and we find a consistency in the results. However, when we replace our 
analysis below the median quintile (RisFactor<=50%), we observe a U-
Shaped association (positive association), that is, when the quality of RC 
composition is low, the quality of AC improves FRQ.  
the firm’s LMVAL
t 
as a natural logarithm of the total 
firm market value at the year end. In addition, we 
control for Leverage which is the sum total of short 
and long term liabilities scaled by total assets (e.g., 
Woidtke and Yeh 2013). AuditBig is equal to 1 if a 
firm employs one of the big accounting firms (Big 
four), otherwise 0. Also, following Burgstahler et al. 
(2006), we control for firm’s profitability using 
Return on Assets (ROA). In  agreement with Francis 
and Wang (2008), we add two growth variables; BM is 
calculated as the book value over market value 
(Klein 2002; MacGregor 2012); RavGrowth is also 
included, based on (Francis and Wang 2008), 
calculated as total revenue change (total revenue 
t
, 
less total revenue 
t-1
). We also follow Vafeas (2005), 
Burgstahler et al. (2006) and Xie et al. (2003) to 
control for internal board busyness. a. MajIndDir is 
equal to 1 if the firm has majority of independent 
auditors, otherwise 0. For instance, Xie et al. (2003) 
and Vafeas (2005) suggest that an independent 
board manages to protect the shareholders’ interests 
and increases the  firm’s earning quality. b. 
MoreComDir is equal to 1, if the board’s chairman is 
assigned in at least one of the board committees, 
otherwise 0. Based on busyness literature (e.g., 
Faleye et al. 2011), we argue that a busy chairman 
will devote less time to managing the firm. c. 
Following prior literature (e.g., Brickley et al. 1997; 
Xie et al. 2003), we include that DualityCEO is equal 
to 1 if the firm’s chairman and CEO is held by one 
person, otherwise 0. 
We also control for country-specific factors 
using, a). GovFactor: Following Leuz et al. (2003) and 
Gul et al. (2013), we conduct a Factor Analysis 
(GovFactor 
t) 
25 of country level governance (which 
covers regulatory quality26 and control of corruption 
from Kaufmann et al. (2009)),27 and country investor 
protection index (which covers the extent of 
directors’ liabilities and ease of shareholders to suit 
directors and managers from (La Porta et al. 2000)); 
b). We also include the country’s MCapDev in year
t
 
calculated by, total country market capitalization in 
year
t
 scaled by country GDP in year
t 
as a country-
specific measure to control for country omitted 
variables (Pástor et al. 2008). Finally, we fixed effects 
and the firm’s random effects (see discussion 
section 4.3 on the model selection).28 
 
3.5. Empirical Model 
 
To examine the conditional test of “voluntary” 
adoption of risk monitoring committee and the 
association between AC and FRQ, we employ the 
following model:  
                                                          
25 We check the factor value year by year and find that values vary for each 
country and year.   
26 Regulation Quality consists of trade policy, competitive environment and 
labour market policies. 
27 Control of Corruption consists of transparency and corruption. 
28 Furthermore, we segregate our sample based on 2 code financial industry 
(Bank, Financial, Insurance and Investment), and when we fix the industry 
effects for all our main models, unreported results show consistent evidence. 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 13, Issue 3, Spring 2016, Continued - 2 
 
 315   
                                                                                            
                                                                                         
 ∑            
(3) 
 
Our main variable of interest is DummyAudCom, we 
predict    to be negative for H1, if the firm 
voluntarily adopts a high quality of RC (RisFactor > 
50% quintal).  
To examine the association between FRQ and 
the quality of AC in the presence of RC (H
1b
), we 
repeat equation (1), and replace (a
1
) DummyAudCom 
with two measures of quality of AC: AudFactor and 
AudComScaled, then we replace our conditional test 
by replacing RisFactor, with DummyRisCom:  
 
                                                                                           
                                                                                         
 ∑             
(4.1) 
 
                                                                                             
                                                                                         
  ∑             
(4.2) 
 
We expect the sign of the coefficient (a
1
) between 
FRQ and quality of AC (AudFactor and 
AudComScaled) to be negative and significant, if 
firms adopt additional monitoring committee 
(        ), suggesting that adopting additional 
monitoring committee (e.g., RC) will compromise the 
effectiveness of the existing monitoring committee 
(e.g., AC).  
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel D of Table 1 reports summary statistics for 
the variables included in the regression models. The 
mean [Standard Deviation (S.D)] value for 
DummyAudCom, AudFactor and AudComScaled 
variables are 0.65(0.48), -0.02 (0.84), and 1.03 (1.0) 
respectively. RiskFactor and DummyRisCom is -0.02 
(0.82), and 0.38 (0.49). In the sample, 38% financial 
firms have dedicated risk committee (RC), which is 
higher than that of Subramaniam et al. (2009) of 33% 
and Aebi et al. (2012) of 8%. There may be two 
reasons for this differential statistics. First, 
Subramaniam et al. (2009) covers both financial and 
non-financial firms, while we cover only financial 
firms. Since risk exposure of financial firms is 
higher, establishment of separate risk committee is 
more apparent for financial sectors. Second, Aebi et 
al. (2012) cover only the financial crisis period. 
Further, our mean of DummyAudCom is lower than 
Carson (2002) where she investigates only 361 firms 





are 8.61 (58.6) and 2.07(9.35) 
respectively. Our results are consistent with prior 
research in earning quality for instance, in FRQ 
proxy’s mean.  
Based on current discretionary accrual derived 
from (Jones 1991) is 2.20. However, our variables 
discussed above have exhibited over-dispersion 
since in most cases their variances are higher than 
their means. That might be due to selection bias 
error; hence we later test for sample selection bias 
problem in section 4.5.  Moreover, the Table shows 
that there is a large dispersion among the sample 
firms in terms of control variables, which illustrates 
a considerable diversity in the sample. 
 
Table 1 Panel D. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables N Mean S.D Min Mdn Mix 
(ABS) FRQ 
Kothari
 649 -8.61 58.60 -1404.17 -3.11 0.00 
(ABS) FRQ 
Jones
 669 2.07 9.35 0.00 0.12 118.46 
(ABS) FRQ 
DD
 325 3.59 11.61 0.00 0.36 117.29 
DummyAudCom
t
 649 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 
AudFactor
t
 649 -0.02 0.84 -1.29 0.00 2.36 
AudComScaled
t
 649 1.03 1.00 0.00 1.00 5.00 
RiskFactor
t
 649 -0.02 0.82 -0.60 -0.60 2.68 
RC
 t
 649 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LMVAL
t log
 649 6.19 1.70 2.46 6.17 9.74 
Leverage 
t%
 649 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.72 2.39 
AuditBig
 t
 649 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 1.00 
ROA
t
% 649 1.86 5.23 -49.30 2.14 32.80 
BM
t
% 649 3.20 13.25 -0.38 0.93 230.05 
RavGrowth 
t
 649 11.87 72.00 -172.08 2.49 439.10 
MajIndDir
 t
 649 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
MoreComDir
 t
 649 0.27 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 
DualityCEO 
t
 649 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 1.00 
GovFactor 
t
 649 0.02 1.01 -1.48 -0.15 1.60 
MCapDev
 t
 649 71.89 36.51 24.60 72.50 163.90 
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4.2. Univariate t-Test  
 
Panel D of Table 1, reports the mean difference and 
t-statistic of variables for firms with (without) 
separate RC. We find that the FRQ proxies and 
Quality of AC (AudFactor) are significantly higher for 
firms with separate RC (t -value = 1.739, 2.038, 
1.738, 2.292, and 8.429) at (p<0.01% level) 
respectively. The table also shows that the firm that 
establishes separate RC has larger size, leverage, 
busyness proxies (MoreComDir and DualityCEO) and 
AuditBig.  
 
Table 2 Panel E. Means differences between presence (absence) of RC and Quality of RC 
 
 


















 -2.964 -2.670 2.293 1.738* 
AudFactor
t 
0.477 0.810 0.6811 8.429*** 
LMVAL
t 
6.417 5.941 -0.4757 3.53*** 
Leverage 
t
 0.656 0.642 -0.0333 1.3401 
AuditBig
 t
 0.941 0.880 0.0608 2.673*** 
ROA
t
% 1.883 1.732 0.1517 0.446 
BM
t
% 1.832 1.777 0.0554 0.2902 
RavGrowth
t 
7.714 14.403 6.689 1.213 
MajIndDir
t 
0.357 0.334 0.0235 0.6414 
MoreComDir
t 
0.343 0.222 0.1203 3.535*** 
DualityCEO
t 
0.014 0.118 0.1037 5.09*** 
GovFactor 
t
 -0.194 0.123 0.3176 4.158*** 
MCapDev
t 
65.636 73.258 7.6228 2.697*** 
FRQ 
Kothari: 









Quality based on Dechow and Dichev, 2002 
calculated for each year in each industry; DummyAudCom: firms recorded 1 if audit committee existed, otherwise 0; AudFactor: 
quality of audit committee calculated based on component factor analysis obtained from 4 characteristics : qualification, majority of 
independence, independent chair and size; AudComScaled is total score of audit committee from the four characteristics divided on 4; 
RiskFactor: AudFactor: quality of risk committee calculated based on component factor analysis obtained from 4 characteristics which 
are qualification, majority of independence, independent chair and size; Size: natural log of firms’ market value proxy for firm’s size; 
Leverage: total short and long term debt over total asset; AuditBig: firm is reported 1 if at least one of auditor in year t is from the big 
accounting firm: ROA: Return of Asset, BM: firms’ book value divided on market value; RavGrowth: firms’ total revenue growth 
calculated as the difference of total revenue in year t and t-1: MajIndDir: is firm-specific governance measure calculated if firm’s has 
majority independent board of directors 1, otherwise 0: MoreComDir: Busyness measure if the chairman of the board is a member in 
at least one of the board committee 1, otherwise 0: DualityCEO: if firm’s chairman and CEO is one person 1, otherwise 0; GovFactor: 
score obtained after factor analysis of country investor protection index (which covers extent of director liability and ease of 
shareholders’ suit against directors and managers) and country level governance (which covers regulatory quality and control of 
corruption): MCapDev: country level measure calculated total stock market divided on GDP  in year t and country 
 
Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation matrix 
for variables included in the regression analysis. In 
line with our hypothesis and as expected, the 
correlation between the FRQ proxies and AC is 
positive and significant, while this association is 
negative and significant with RC. For instance, the  






 and quality of AC (AudFactor) are 
0.785, 0.0740 at (p<0.05% level). Moreover, busyness 
proxy (DualityCEO) is significantly and negatively 
correlated with the FRQ proxies, suggesting that 
internal busyness proxied by duality of CEO and 
Chairman, reduce the firms’ FRQ, while for second 
measure of board internal busyness (MoreComDir), 
Table 2 provides mixed  correlation results. 
Likewise, unreported results show mixed evidence 
for outside directorship (proxy of external board 
busyness). Specifically, we find negative results with 
FRQ 
Kothari
 but not with other FRQ proxies. These 
results suggest that external directorship plays a 
less important role in the GCC financial firms’ 
reporting quality and this in fact is consistent with 
TNI Survey (2008), that external directorship is not 
an important phenomenon in the GCC region. In 
addition, our results in Table 2 are in line with prior 
hypotheses in terms of control variables. For 
example, we find positive (significant) results 
between FRQ and (leverage, LMVAL, AuditBig and 
country governance as well as the investor 
protection level). This also validates our control 




4.4. Regression Analysis   
 
4.4.1. Association between FRQ and 
DummyAudCom in the presence of High quality 
RisFactor 
 
Table 3 presents Random Effect (RE) estimates of 
H
1a
. We statistically test for the empirical model 
(pooling, random effect, or fixed effect regression), 
which is the most suitable for estimating the 
relationship. Specifically, following Aivazian et al. 
(2005), we conduct the Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) 
test of the random effect model (Breusch and Pagan 
1980). The null hypothesis is that the individual 
effect, a
i
, is 0 for all i. The null hypothesis is not 
rejected at the 1% significance level, which suggests 
that Random Effect regression is appropriate for our 
model. Thereafter, we follow Hausman (1979) test to 
choose our model between fixed effect and random 
effect. Fixed effect models suggest that individual 
firms and time have different intercepts in the 
regression equation, while random effect assumes 
that individual firms group and time have different 
disturbance. The null hypothesis is that fixed effect 
is not correlated with the regressor (or our main 
independent and control variables). We fail to reject 
the null hypothesis in all of our models, suggesting 
that random effects model is still more appropriate; 
therefore, time-invariant variables should be 
included in our equation. We also test for 
Heteroskedasticity, using Wald test, which rejects 
the fact that our models  are homoscedastic, hence, 
we robust and cluster firms into 69 groups. 
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Table 2. Person Correlation Matrix 
 
           
FRQ 
Kothari: 








FRQ based on Dechow and 
Dichev, 2002 calculated for each year in each industry; DummyAudCom: firms recorded 1 if audit committee existed, otherwise 0; AudFactor: quality of audit committee calculated based on component factor 
analysis obtained from 4 characteristics : qualification, majority of independence, independent chair and size; AudComScaled is total score of audit committee from the four characteristics divided on 4; 
RiskFactor: AudFactor: quality of risk committee calculated based on component factor analysis obtained from 4 characteristics which are qualification, majority of independence, independent chair and size; 
Size: natural log of firms’ market value proxy for firm’s size; Leverage: total short and long term debt over total asset; AuditBig: firm is reported 1 if at least one of auditor in year t is from the big accounting 
firm: ROA: Return of Asset, BM: firms’ book value divided on market value; RavGrowth: firms’ total revenue growth calculated as the difference of total revenue in year t and t-1: MajIndDir: is firm-specific 
governance measure calculated if firm’s has majority independent board of directors 1, otherwise 0: MoreComDir: Busyness measure if the chairman of the board is a member in at least one of the board 
committee 1, otherwise 0: DualityCEO: if firm’s chairman and CEO is one person 1, otherwise 0; GovFactor: score obtained after factor analysis of country investor protection index (which covers extent of 
director liability and ease of shareholders’ suit against directors and managers) and country level governance (which covers regulatory quality and control of corruption): MCapDev: country level measure 
calculated total stock market divided on GDP  in year t and country i. 
 
1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
EQ Kothari 1.0000
EQ Jones 0.9041*** 1.0000
EQ DD 0.7513*** 0.7633*** 1.0000
DummyAudCom 0.0979** 0.0956** 0.0771 1.0000
AudFactor 0.0785** 0.0740** 0.0523 0.6922*** 1.0000
AudComScaled 0.0873** 0.0917** 0.0621 0.5149*** 0.7720*** 1.0000
RisComFactor -0.0769** -0.0458 -0.0853 0.0454 0.2916*** 0.6261*** 1.0000
LMVAL 0.3143*** 0.2205*** 0.3236*** 0.0249 -0.0883** -0.0382 -0.0392 1.0000
Leverage t 0.1766*** 0.1419*** 0.1125** 0.0723** 0.0795** 0.0507 -0.0464 0.3561*** 1.0000
AuditBig t 0.0657*** 0.0588 0.0365 0.0314 0.1014*** 0.0394 0.0463 0.1849*** 0.1863*** 1.0000
ROA t -0.0074 -0.0333 -0.0067 -0.0719** 0.0110 0.0202 0.0551 0.0320 -0.0340 0.0440 1.0000
BM 0.0804** 0.0534 -0.0181 -0.1241*** -0.0226 0.0957*** 0.1683*** 0.2917*** 0.3036*** -0.0481 -0.0709** 1.0000
RavGrowth 0.0346 0.0165 0.0453 -0.0544 0.0282 0.0451 0.0286 -0.0231 0.0109 -0.0261 0.2585*** 0.0071 1.0000
MajIndDir -0.0373 -0.0214 -0.0733 0.2073*** 0.5111*** 0.6389*** 0.5460*** -0.1840*** -0.0009 0.0943** 0.0638** 0.0347 0.0287 1.0000
MoreComDir 0.0459 0.0685* -0.0051 0.3056*** 0.3906*** 0.5962*** 0.3913*** 0.0186 0.0600* 0.0672* 0.0648* 0.0179 0.0627* 0.2921* 1.0000
DualityCEO -0.0635* -0.0447 -0.0915* -0.3188*** -0.2965*** -0.1383*** 0.0934*** -0.0865** -0.1422*** -0.0672* -0.0377 -0.0094 -0.0384 -0.0398 -0.0502 1.0000
GovFactor t 0.0631 0.0598 0.0866 -0.2950*** -0.3922*** -0.2754*** -0.0999*** 0.3508*** -0.0028 -0.0889** -0.0934** 0.1844*** -0.0208 -0.2704*** -0.1221*** 0.2800*** 1.0000
MCapDev -0.0355 -0.0762** -0.0262 -0.1693*** -0.3337*** -0.2206*** -0.0706* 0.0949** -0.0913*** -0.1032*** 0.1765*** 0.0190 0.0372 -0.2377*** -0.0640* 0.1574*** 0.2078*** 1.0000
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In all tables, we illustrate the p value for LM 
between OLS and RE and Hausman test (p-value) 
between fixed effects and random effects and robust 
and cluster effects. We hypothesize that firms that 
voluntarily adopt RC are more likely to signal their 
prestigious board, and in order to keep their signal 
costly to imitate, RC composition should be at a high 
level and should be observed. However, we assume 
that these firms will reduce the effectiveness of AC 
to improve FRQ. As hypothesized earlier, we can 
expect that in a firm where the composition quality 
of RC is at a higher level, the AC has a significant 
and negative association with FRQ. In Table 3, we 
find that in the presence of a high RC (RisFactor), 
the relationship between AC and FRQ is significant 
and negative. Specifically, the coefficient (a
1
) of FRQ 
Kothari
 and DummyAudCom is -1.043 at (p<0.1% level), 
and the coefficient of FRQ 
Jones
 is -1.299 but not 
significant. We also find that the consistent sign 
(negative) of the firm’s size (LMVAL), leverage, BM, 
AuditBig are consistent with previous findings 
(Burgstahler et al. 2006; Francis and Wang 2008; 
Klein 2002; MacGregor 2012; Vafeas 2005; Woidtke 
and Yeh 2013; Xie et al. 2003). Although, we collect 
our sample from the financial industry, motivated 
by prior literature, we disaggregate our sample 
based on two-code industry based on the Capital IQ 
database, obtaining (4 classes of sub-industry,  
based on stock markets classification (1. banks, 2. 
Financial, brokerage and superannuation, 3. 
Insurance, and 4. Investment). Unreported results 
show robust evidence even after industry fixed 
effect. For instance, for the FRQ 
Jones 
model, we find 
1.282 coefficient at (p<0.1% level) and for FRQ 
Kothari 
model, it is -0.623 but not significant. Then we re-
run the regression and if RisFactor quality <.50, we 
expect that a
1
 will be positive. Un-tabulated result 
finds a positive association of 1.0584. These results 
suggest that the “voluntary” formation of RC 
generates more monitoring responsibilities on the 
board, which compromises the AC (quality and 
composition), and thus, FRQ is reduced. 
 








































































 -0.010 0.017 
 
(-0.70) (1.07) 
Robust/Cluster Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
N 649 646 
N-RisFactor 148 149 
LM (p-value): OLS vs RE 0.000 0.000 
LM: Chi(2) 20.41 20.47 
Hausman (p-value): FE vs RE 0.2437 0.0608 
Sargan-Hansen 14.95 20.346 
FRQ 
Kothari: 




Earning Quality based on Jones 
(1991) mode calculated for each year in each industry
; 
DummyAudCom: firms recorded 1 if audit committee existed, otherwise 0; 
RiskFactor: AudFactor: quality of risk committee calculated based on component factor analysis obtained from 4 characteristics which 
are qualification, majority of independence, independent chair and size; Size: natural log of firms’ market value proxy for firm’s size; 
Leverage: total short and long term debt over total asset; AuditBig: firm is reported 1 if at least one of auditor in year t is from the big 
accounting firm: ROA: Return of Asset, BM: firms’ book value divided on market value; RavGrowth: firms’ total revenue growth 
calculated as the difference of total revenue in year t and t-1: MajIndDir: is firm-specific governance measure calculated if firm’s has 
majority independent board of directors 1, otherwise 0: MoreComDir: Busyness measure if the chairman of the board is a member in 
at least one of the board committee 1, otherwise 0: DualityCEO: if firm’s chairman and CEO is one person 1, otherwise 0; GovFactor: 
score obtained after factor analysis of country investor protection index (which covers extent of director liability and ease of 
shareholders’ suit against directors and managers) and country level governance (which covers regulatory quality and control of 
corruption): MCapDev: country level measure calculated total stock market divided on GDP  in year t and country i. 
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4.4.2. Association between FRQ and Quality of AC 
in presence of RC H1b 
 
Table 4 exhibits the association between FRQ and 
Quality of AC (AudFactor), in the presence of the 
dummy variable of RC (1, if a firm adopts a separate 
RC). As mentioned earlier, AudFactor is calculated 
based on factor analysis of 4 characteristics of AC 
(qualification, independence, size, and AC 
Chairman’s independence).(We did not include 
meeting frequency and meeting duration, as we find 
very few companies that disclosed time and meeting 
frequencies in their annual reports and in other 
databases. In addition, most of the firms that 
disclose meeting frequencies do not disclose 
meeting duration. Furthermore, we find that the few 
firms that disclosed meeting related information 
have adopted RC which will inflate our models by 
more zeroes). In this test, we assume that a firm that 
adopts RC (without considering the quality of RC), 
reduces the quality of AC, and hence, lowers FRQ. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the 
existence of RC, moderates the coefficient (a
1
) 





quality of AC. We find significant and negative 





AudFactor at coefficient of 2.101, (1.812) at (p<0.05% 
level). For AudComScaled (sum scores of the four AC 
characteristics (dummies)), our results show same 
inference sign at (p<0.05%) level and a coefficient of 
2.316 (2.494). Furthermore, we find significant sign 
of our internal busyness proxy (DualityCEO) at 
(p<.01%), while MoreComDir another proxy for 
internal busyness proxy, found to be positive but 
not significant. Consistent with prior literature, we 
also find that LMVAL, Leverage, BM, DualCEO and 
country level measures (McapDev), have significant 
inference. Even after fixing the industry effects, we 
find that for instance, for FRQ 
Jones 
at (p<0.05%) 
significance level for both AudFactor and 
AudComScaled, is negative but not significant for 
the FRQ 
Kothari
 model. This suggests that the voluntary 
formation of RC lowers the quality of AC which 
negatively influences the FRQ.. 
In the aforementioned discussion, our results 
are obtained after regressing the aggregated 
measures of AC (AudFactor and AudComScaled), 
with FRQ, in the presence of RC.  However, 
motivated by previous studies (e.g., Woidtke and Yeh 
2013), we then test each individual characteristics in 
the presence and absence of RC. In this test, we 
expect to observe a U-shaped relationship (positive 
association between AC and FRQ) if firms do not 
adopt the RC, and negative relationship (negative 
association between AC and FRQ) if firms adopt high 
quality RC. This is exactly what we find. Specifically, 
Un-tabulated results show that firms that adopt RC 
suppress the association between AC and FRQ (e.g., 
FRQ 
Kothari
). On the other hand, we find a positive 
association between AC and FRQ for firms without 
RC. However, coefficients are not significant except 
for the independent Chair of AC.   
In summary, our results suggest that the 
formation of RC reduces the quality of AC 
composition which in turn lowers financial reporting 
quality. This result is generally consistent with the 
recent findings of Tani and Smith (2015), who 
demonstrate that the busyness of the audit 
committee chair and financial expert weaken the 
monitoring and oversight role that audit committees 
play in the financial reporting process. 
 
4.5. Self-selection bias  
 
RC is a growing practice in financial firms; hence we 
collect our sample from financial firms. However, 
choosing financial firms and testing the hypothesis 
in the presence of RC can create a selection bias 
problem, that the estimators are inconsistent and 
bias. For instance, average firms without RC, may 
have higher than average FRQs and a firm with AC, 
may have lower than average FRQ, evidenced by 
over-dispertion of our mean and variance in our 
main variables. Therefore, we conduct a self-
selection bias test. Specifically, we test Heckman's 
(1979) procedure, where we first compute the  
Inverse Mills ratio (InvMills)   from a probit model 
for random effect model of AC in the fims then we 
add InvMills  ratio in our control variables in all 
equations to control for self-selection bias.  
In the probit model for random effect model, 
we include three variables that  determine the probit 
model of AC, which are; number of board of 
directors, the Firm’s size (assets
log
) and total debt 
over total asset based on Bradbury (1990) and Chau 
and Leung (2006). Firstly, Bradbury (1990), Certo 
(2003) and  Faleye et al. (2011) suggest board size 
and compositon, and monitoring committee, 
detremined the assignment of AC membership, 
hence, we  include board size. Song and Windram 
(2004) and Carson (2002), find that the firm’s size 
has a postive assocaiton with the formation of AC, 
while Carson (2004) report a negative  assocation 
between AC and (total debt / total assets). Table 5 
presents the second-stage probit regression model, 
where we find that the regression coefficient for AC 
is negatively and significantly associated with FRQ 
Kothari  
(p< 0.05%), suggesting that even after 
controlling for self-selection bias, our inference is 
un-changed, that is in the presence of high quality of 
RC, the association between AC and  FRQ is negative. 
 
4.6. Additional Analysis and Sensitive tests 
 
4.6.1. Other measure of FRQ 
 
We also test for sensitivity analysis of our dependent 
variable (FRQ), using a third measure that has been 
widely used in previous literature [(Dechow and 
Dichev 2002) therefore, FRQ
DD
]. The third proxy of 
Financial Reporting Quality is calculated based on 





































cash from operation scaled by 
lagged total asset, OCF
t
 is cash from operation 
scaled by lagged total asset, OCF
 t+1
 is cash from 
operation scaled by total asset, Rev
t
 is change of 
total revenue scaled by total lagged asset, PPE
t
 is the 
total of the firm’s property, plant and equipment 
scaled by total lagged asset. Residual represents the 
estimation errors in current accrual that is not 
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associated with OCF, change in Revenue and the 
firm’s level of PPE. This procedure results in less 
data and we find only 325 year observations.  
We regress AudFactor and AudComScaled with 
both FRQ proxies, in presence of RC. Panel A Table 6 
shows that AudFactor (AudComScaled) is -2.611 
which is significant at (p<0.01% level) with FRQ
DD
. 
The sign and significant levels in control variables in 
the regression models are in line with the baseline 
regression. Our results are consistent with our 
hypothesis which states that the presence of RC 
lowers FRQ through reducing the quality of audit 





4.6.2. Average of FRQ proxies 
 
Following Chen et al. (2011) and Biddle et al. (2009), 







 and FRQ 
DD
. Chen et al. 
(2011), suggest that using average proxy for FRQ is 
more appropriate for three reasons. First, one single 
measure cannot cover all facets of FRQ. Second, 
aggregating different proxies of FRQ help to 
generalize the results. Third, using average proxy 
reduces measurement error that is generated from 
using one proxy which consists of factors other than 
FRQ.  Panel B of Table 6 shows that our inference is 
unchanged, that is, we find that the coefficient of 
AudFactor (AudComScaled)  are significantly and 
negatively associated with FRQ 
Ave
 of 1.396 (1.779), in 
the presence of RC at (p<0.05% level). 
 
Table 4. FRQ and Quality of Audit Committee in presence of Dummy Risk Committee 
 




































































































































Robust/Cluster Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
N 647 647 
 
649 649 
N-RC 255 255 
 
250 250 
LM (p-value): OLS vs RE 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
LM: Chi(2) 194.05 180.09 
 
14.23 14.15 
Hausman (p-value): FE vs RE 0.263 0.2463 
 
0.313 0.3192 









FRQ based on Jones (1991) mode 
calculated for each year in each industry
; 
AudFactor: quality of audit committee calculated based on component factor analysis 
obtained from 4 characteristics : qualification, majority of independence, independent chair and size; AudComScaled is total score of 
audit committee from the four characteristics divided on 4; RC equal 1 if a firm voluntarily adopted risk committee, otherwise 0; Size: 
natural log of firms’ market value proxy for firm’s size; Leverage: total short and long term debt over total asset; AuditBig: firm is 
reported 1 if at least one of auditor in year t is from the big accounting firm: ROA: Return of Asset, BM: firms’ book value divided on 
market value; RavGrowth: firms’ total revenue growth calculated as the difference of total revenue in year t and t-1: MajIndDir: is 
firm-specific governance measure calculated if firm’s has majority independent board of directors 1, otherwise 0: MoreComDir: 
Busyness measure if the chairman of the board is a member in at least one of the board committee 1, otherwise 0: DualityCEO: if 
firm’s chairman and CEO is one person 1, otherwise 0; GovFactor: score obtained after factor analysis of country investor protection 
index (which covers extent of director liability and ease of shareholders’ suit against directors and managers) and country level 
governance (which covers regulatory quality and control of corruption): MCapDev: country level measure calculated total stock market 
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Intercept 7.785*** 3.787 































































 -9.932* -3.227 
 
(-1.71) (-0.65) 
Robust/Cluster Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
N 464 455 
N-RC 148 149 
FRQ 
Kothari: 




FRQ based on Jones (1991) mode 
calculated for each year in each industry
; 
AudFactor: quality of audit committee calculated based on component factor analysis 
obtained from 4 characteristics : qualification, majority of independence, independent chair and size; AudComScaled is total score of 
audit committee from the four characteristics divided on 4; Size: natural log of firms’ market value proxy for firm’s size; Leverage: 
total short and long term debt over total asset; AuditBig: firm is reported 1 if at least one of auditor in year t is from the big accounting 
firm: ROA: Return of Asset, BM: firms’ book value divided on market value; RavGrowth: firms’ total revenue growth calculated as the 
difference of total revenue in year t and t-1: MajIndDir: is firm-specific governance measure calculated if firm’s has majority 
independent board of directors 1, otherwise 0: MoreComDir: Busyness measure if the chairman of the board is a member in at least 
one of the board committee 1, otherwise 0: DualityCEO: if firm’s chairman and CEO is one person 1, otherwise 0; GovFactor: score 
obtained after factor analysis of country investor protection index (which covers extent of director liability and ease of shareholders’ 
suit against directors and managers) and country level governance (which covers regulatory quality and control of corruption): 
MCapDev: country level measure calculated total stock market divided on GDP  in year t and country i; InvMills is predicted residual 
from Probit regression between, Board_Size, Size, and Total debt /Total Asset. 
 
4.7. Potential time-series dependence 
 
We perform the analyses at firms that do not adopt 
RC
t-1
 in the previous year, but adopt the RC
t  
in the 
current year. First, if a firm does not adopt RC
t-1
, we 
expect that there is less internal monitoring 
busyness, due to less incentive to create or signal 
their prestige RC. Second, if a firm voluntarily 
adopts RC
t
 in the current year, it is more likely that 
the firm with voluntary RC will face more internal 
busyness issue on the board. Therefore, we re-run 
our regressions for firms that did not adopt RC in 




but adopted RC in the 
current year (RC
t-1 
=1). Un-tabulated results provide 
consistent evidence of negative association between 
FRQ
Ave 
and the quality of AC in all regressions. For 
instance, the coefficients association between  






, and FRQ 
Ave
) are 2.742, 2.426, 2.434, 
0.001, and 1.712 respectively, which are all 
significant at (p<0.05% level). We also find negative, 
but not significant, using AudFactor. This also 
provides robustness for our hypothesis that a firm 
that voluntarily chooses to adopt RC has less FRQ 
due to lower composition quality of AC.  
 
4.8. Board Ownership Representatives Setting in 
GCC 
 
One of the salient features in the GCC is that the 
boards of publicly listed companies are represented 
by members of the Government, private families and 
ruling families (TNI Survey 2008). Hence, we repeat 
our regressions including the three types of 
ownership (GovDir, FamilyDir and RoyalDir). After 
adding the three types of directors, un-tabulated 
results lend consistent support (not changed) 
regarding sign and the statistical magnitude, while 
some coefficients show highly significant results 
after controlling for the three ownership attributes. 
The coefficients regressions of AudFactor 







, and FRQ 
Ave
) are 1.868(2.293), 1.567(2.523), 
2.253(2.786) , and 1.158(1.770) respectively, and all 
are negative and significant at (p<0.05% level) and 
for FRQ
DD
, significant level at (p<0.01%). Moreover, 
we regress if AudCom is dummy (1 or 0) with FRQ 
Ave
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in the presence of high quality composition of RC 
(RisFactor). We find a negative and significant 
association between DummyAudCom and FRQ 
Ave
 of 
1.033 at (p<0.05%). Further, the RoyalDir and GovDir 
are found to be negative with FRQ proxies, while 
FamilyDir is positive with FRQ. We also noticed that 
the significance level varies depending on the main 
independent variable (FRQ).  
 
Table 6 Panel A: Additional Analysis: FRQ and Quality of Audit Committee in presence of Dummy Risk 
















































































Robust/Cluster Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
N 324 324 
N-RC 130 130 
LM (p-value): OLS vs RE 0.000 0.000 
LM: Chi(2) 157.69 125.05 
Hausman (p-value): FE vs RE 0.5243 0.575 
Sargan-Hansen statistic 10.068 9.51 
FRQ 
DD: 
FRQ based on Dechow and Dichev, 2002 calculated for each year in each industry; AudFactor: quality of audit committee 
calculated based on component factor analysis obtained from 4 characteristics : qualification, majority of independence, independent 
chair and size; AudComScaled is total score of audit committee from the four characteristics divided on 4; RC equal 1 if a firm 
voluntarily adopted risk committee, otherwise 0; Size: natural log of firms’ market value proxy for firm’s size; Leverage: total short and 
long term debt over total asset; AuditBig: firm is reported 1 if at least one of auditor in year t is from the big accounting firm: ROA: 
Return of Asset, BM: firms’ book value divided on market value; RavGrowth: firms’ total revenue growth calculated as the difference of 
total revenue in year t and t-1: MajIndDir: is firm-specific governance measure calculated if firm’s has majority independent board of 
directors 1, otherwise 0: MoreComDir: Busyness measure if the chairman of the board is a member in at least one of the board 
committee 1, otherwise 0: DualityCEO: if firm’s chairman and CEO is one person 1, otherwise 0; GovFactor: score obtained after factor 
analysis of country investor protection index (which covers extent of director liability and ease of shareholders’ suit against directors 
and managers) and country level governance (which covers regulatory quality and control of corruption): MCapDev: country level 




The primary purpose of this study is to enhance our 
understanding of internal board busyness and its 
effect on the qualities of corporate monitoring and 
financial reporting. We investigate whether the 
voluntary adoption of an additional monitoring 
committee (e.g., RC) adversely influences the board’s 
audit committee’s effectiveness (e.g., AC). 
Using a unique dataset from six GCC countries, 
we obtain a number of interesting results. First, we 
find new evidence that the voluntary adoption of 
high quality RC has an adverse consequence on 
audit committee’s effectiveness through less 
monitoring of a firm’s FRQ. Second, we find that the 
voluntary adoption of RC reduces AC’s effectiveness. 
In other words, our results indicate that voluntarily 
adopting a Risk Committee reduces the quality of 
Audit Committee composition which in turn, 
reduces financial reporting quality. Our findings are 
robust after controlling for several firm-specific and 
country-specific factors, and using various proxies 
for FRQ and AC. Our conclusions remained 






Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 13, Issue 3, Spring 2016, Continued - 2 
 
 323   










































 -0.045 -0.051 
 
(-0.86) (-0.95) 
BM 0.719** 0.699** 
 
(2.38) (2.35) 
RavG -0.003 -0.003 
 
(-1.50) (-1.52) 
MajIndDir 3.041*** 3.293*** 
 
(2.85) (2.71) 
MoreComDir 0.957 1.600* 
 
(1.14) (1.75) 





 -0.499 -0.443 
 
(-0.67) (-0.59) 
MCapDev 0.052* 0.051* 
 
(1.86) (1.85) 
Robust/Cluster Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
N 669 669 
N-RC 250 250 
FRQ 
Ave 












DummyAudCom: firms recorded 1 if audit committee 
existed, otherwise 0; AudFactor: quality of audit committee calculated based on component factor analysis obtained from 4 
characteristics : qualification, majority of independence, independent chair and size; AudComScaled is total score of audit committee 
from the four characteristics divided on 4; RiskFactor: AudFactor: quality of risk committee calculated based on component factor 
analysis obtained from 4 characteristics which are qualification, majority of independence, independent chair and size; Size: natural 
log of firms’ market value proxy for firm’s size; Leverage: total short and long term debt over total asset; AuditBig: firm is reported 1 if 
at least one of auditor in year t is from the big accounting firm: ROA: Return of Asset, BM: firms’ book value divided on market value; 
RavGrowth: firms’ total revenue growth calculated as the difference of total revenue in year t and t-1: MajIndDir: is firm-specific 
governance measure calculated if firm’s has majority independent board of directors 1, otherwise 0: MoreComDir: Busyness measure if 
the chairman of the board is a member in at least one of the board committee 1, otherwise 0: DualityCEO: if firm’s chairman and CEO 
is one person 1, otherwise 0; GovFactor: score obtained after factor analysis of country investor protection index (which covers extent 
of director liability and ease of shareholders’ suit against directors and managers) and country level governance (which covers 
regulatory quality and control of corruption): MCapDev: country level measure calculated total stock market divided on GDP  in year t 
and country i.  
 
This study contributes to corporate governance 
literature in several important ways. First, prior 
studies focused primarily on investigating the effect 
of outside board busyness on a firm’s board internal 
advising role, however, whether introducing 
voluntary monitoring RC enhances or undermines 
board effectiveness has not been investigated yet, 
despite its importance. Our study is the first to test 
how the voluntarily formation of an additional board 
monitoring committee such as the RC reduces the 
effectiveness of monitoring by the audit committee. 
Second, we theoretically introduce an interaction 
between signalling and busyness theories to explain 
how the voluntary creation of an additional 
monitoring committee (e.g., RC) can influence the 
board’s effectiveness, by testing the conditional 
effects between the FRQ and the monitoring quality 
of AC in presence of RC. Third, our study 
investigates the interplay of relationship between 
the audit committee, financial reporting quality and 
risk management committee. Our results suggest 
that the internal busyness of the board monitoring 
sub-committee can harm shareholders’ interests 
through increasing the oversight time of monitoring 
directors on the board.   
In sum, we find that the busyness of board 
members can have a significant impact on the 
effectiveness of their monitoring abilities and 
capacity. Our findings suggest that multiple layers 
of monitoring capacity viz-a-viz the existence of 
both an audit and risk committee may impair the 
quality of monitoring provided by that audit 
committee. The implication is that the regulators 
need to consider directors’ commitments and 
busyness in making rules for mandatory 
establishment of risk committee. In addition, firms 
who intend to improve their financial reporting 
quality should think seriously about the 
consequences of adding a new committee on the 
effectiveness of audit committee before deciding to 
form this new committee.  
Overall, this study has implications for the 
corporations, regulators and investors and should 
attract the attention of policy makers. This study 
has international implications for regulators that 
have rules governing the existence and composition 
of committees. It is expected that the findings of 
this study would be instructive and applicable to 
other countries in the Middle East region, due to the 
similarity in their social, political and economic 
environment. 
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The study, however, has a few limitations that 
suggest a number of avenues for future research. 
First, the study focuses primarily on whether the 
voluntary adoption of RC adversely influences the 
board’s audit committee’s effectiveness. There are 
other committees that are formed by the board that 
may have an adverse effect on the audit committee’s 
effectiveness which may warrant future 
investigation. Second, we use GCC firms in our 
sample. Future studies could extend the research to 
other countries that have similar corporate 
governance environments in the Middle East region. 
Finally, since we exclude non-financial firms from 
our sample, new insights may be gained by 
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